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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, • 
• 
Plaintiff-Respondent, • . 
-v- . Case ~o • 18353 • 
DONALD F. WILLIA~S, . . 
Defendant-Appellant. . . 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Theft by Deception in 
violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-405 for issuing worthless 
checks on several occasions in January, 1982. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant entered a plea of no contest to the charge 
of issuing checks against insufficient funds on February 18, 
1982, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist in the Second 
Judicial District Court. ~e was sentenced on March 1, 1982, 
to a term of zero to five years by the same judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ()N APP~AL 
Respondent seeks an Order of this Court affirming 
the lower court's decision in accepting appellant's plea and 
the sentence imposed therefor. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was arrested on January 22, 1982, and 
charged with Theft by Deception {R. 2). He had previously 
transferred funds to his account at First Security Bank from 
his Bank of Utah account {T. 5). However, he had no funds in 
the Bank of Utah account, which was in fact closed (T. 9). He 
also had arranged to have his Social Security checks deposited 
directly in the First Security Bank account, but this process 
would take at least two months to begin {T. 6). Appellant had 
some accumulated Social Security funds due him which he 
arranged to receive either personally, at the Post Office, or 
at First Security Bank {T. 14). However, despite these 
various arrangements, he had no funds actually in his account 
when he wrote several checks on that account. In fact, in 
viewing the evidence most favorable to appellant's position, 
he could not have expected to have enough money in the account 
to cover his withdrawals {T. 6). 
At the time appellant was arrested, he was on 
probation in Wyoming, having received a one-year sentence on a 
similar charge (T. 20). He has had numerous charges against 
him in the past (T. 22, 23, 24). Appellant is scheduled to be 
paroled on this charge on October 12, 1982. 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S NO CONTEST PLEA TO THE CHARGE 
OF ISSUING CHEC~S AGAINST INSUFFICIENT 
FUNDS WAS PROPERLY ACCEPTED. 
A plea of guilty or no contest must be made 
voluntarily, without coercion, and with a clear understanding 
of what the charge is. Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 
P.2d 323 (1969). Appellant contends that his plea of no 
contest was the product of coercion. He claims that the 
prosecutor and his own attorney coerced his plea by persuading 
him and bv promising him probation. 
Respondent contends that appellant's plea was 
properly accepted. First, under the Strong, supra, standard 
set forth above, appellant had a clear understanding of the 
charge against him. The judge explained to appellant that he 
was charged with writing checks, knowing some of them would 
not be good (T. 6). Appellant nemonstrated his knowledge of 
the charge when he stated "in other words, saying that I knew 
that--that the check was worthless" (T. 7). Even if the 
record had been silent on this point, it would be presumed 
that defense counsel routinely explained the nature of the 
offense to the appellant. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 
(1976). 
-3-
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Second, in addition to understanding the charge, 
appellant also knew the possible consequences of his plea. He 
was informed that a plea of no contest was the equivalent of a 
jury verdict of guilty (T. 3). He was also informed that by 
pleading no contest he wouln forego his right to a trial (T. 
3). His own attorney explaineo the implications of the plea 
and stated that appellant was willing to take the consequences 
(T. 8). 
When appellant committed this offense, he was 
actually on probation in Wyoming for a similar charge (T. 20). 
In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968, 970 (1968), 
the defendant had seven prior convictions. This Court stated: 
In view of the circumstances here shown, 
including the defendant's experience and 
the fact that he had previously been 
sentenced on the same charge, his 
contention that he was not advised of the 
consequences of his plea of guilty is 
quite incredible (emphasis added). 
Third, not only did appellant understand the charge 
and the consequences of a no contest plea, but his plea was 
entered voluntarily. Appellant agreed to enter a plea of no 
contest if the information was amended to charge "issuing 
checks against insufficient funds" (T. 2) (The original charge 
was "theft by deception.") (R. 1). The judge discussed this 
deal (T. 8, 9), and appellant's attorney stated that the 
reason for appellant's plea was the change in the charge 
-4-
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against him (T. 9). In fact, the prosecutor stated at the 
hearing that there had been no negotiations between himself 
and appellant's counsel (T. 3). 
Even if the prosecutor had offered to recommend 
probation, appellant knew that the Court was not bound by any 
promise. The judge told appellant that the prosecutor, being 
part of the executive branch, could not tell the court what to 
do (T. 3). Appellant agreed (T. 4). The judge further stated 
that he would listen to counsel, but would do what he thought 
was correct and that he did not make deals (T. 4). Appellant 
said he understood (T. 4). It is difficult to see how 
appellant was coerced into pleading no contest when he knew 
that the judge was not bound by any alleged promise of the 
prosecutor. This Court dealt with the problem in State v. 
Garfield, Utah, 552 P.2d 129, 131 (1976), stating: 
Where a defendant is aware there is no 
guarantee the court will agree to follow 
the recommendation of the prosecutor, 
there is no reason to set aside a plea of 
guilty. 
In Klotz v. Turner, 23 Utah 2d 303, 462 P.2d 705 
(1969), the defendant claimed he was coerced into pleading 
guilty because the sheriff promised him leniency. This Court 
felt that the defendant failed to show any substance in the 
claim. In this case, the appellant has also failed to show, 
beyond his bald assertion, that he was in any way coerced 
-5-
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into pleading no contest. Nothing in the record supports 
appellant's claim by showing that his will was overcome or 
that he did not rationally examine his choices. Strong, 
supra. In fact, the judge offered to let him withoraw his 
plea when he still appeared undecided {T. 7). 
This Court has required strong proof of coercion 
before finding a plea to be involuntary. In Gonzales v. 
Turner, 26 Utah 2d 176, 487 P.2d 315 {1971), the trial court 
found that the defendant was suffering from heroin withdrawal 
symptoms at the time he entered his plea. Still, this Court 
found his plea was entered voluntarily. In State v. Mills, 
Utah, 641 P.2d 119 {1982), the defendant claimed that his plea 
was not voluntary because he was under the influence of drugs 
and suffered from headaches and high blood pressure. This 
Court did not accept the defendant's contentions and found 
that his plea was made voluntarily. 
In Thompson v. State, 426 P.2d 995, 998 (Alaska 
/ 
1967), the defendant also entered a guilty plea, hoping for 
probation, which he did not receive. That Court found that: 
The fact that a plea of guilty was entered 
because of the possibility of obtaining a 
more lenient sentence does not make such a 
plea an involuntary one. 
Thus, appellant's hope for probation is not enough to sustain 
his claim of coercion. 
-6-
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When appellant entered his plea, it was upon the 
advice of competent counsel. Guglielmetti v. Turner, 27 Utah 
2d 341, 496 P.2d 261 (1972). Appellant's attorney knew the 
facts of the case and knew the state's potential case. State 
v. Harris, Utah, 585 P.2d 450 (1978). He gave a detailed 
explanation of appellant's version of the facts to the Court 
(T. 4, 5, 6). He assessed the evidence in a manner most 
favorable to appellant (T. 9). He talked to the state's 
witness and therefore knew the strength of the case against 
appellant (T. 10). He was familiar with appellant's defenses. 
He obviously had adequate time to consult with appellant since 
he was well acquainted with the facts at issue. State v. 
Albert, Utah, 584 P.2d 843 (1978). Appellant's attorney gave 
him competent advice based on his assessment of the evidence. 
Kryger v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 214, 479 P.2d 477 (1971). There 
is simply no support in the record for appellant's contention 
that his attorney coerced him into entering his plea. Thus, 
appellant has not met his burden of establishing that his 
counsel was somehow less than effective. Wingfield v. State, 
535 P.2d 1295 (Nev. 1975); State v. McNichol, Utah, 554 P.2d 
203 (1976); State v. Forsyth, Utah, 560 P.2d 337 (1977). 
According to the Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 774 (1970), a defendant is bound by his plea: 
••• unless he can allege and prove 
serious derelictions on the part of 
counsel sufficient to show that his plea 
was not, after all, a knowing and 
intelligent act. 
-7-
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This Court will not interfere with the trial court's 
decision in accepting a plea unless the record plainly 
reflects an abuse of discretion. State v. Forsyth, supra. 
Respondent contends that appellant's plea of no contest was 
made knowingly and voluntarily, upon the advice of competent 
counsel. Thus, the court's decision to accept appellant's 
plea should be upheld. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE A VALID DEFENSE TO 
THE CHARGE. 
Appellant contends that his attorney should have 
prepared a defense to the charge; namely, that appellant 
lacked the requisite intent. However, appellant knew that to 
be found guilty of the charge, he had to have written checks, 
knowing that they were worthless. As mentioned in Point I, 
appellant, the court and his attorney all discussed the fact 
that intent was an element of the charge {T. 6, 7, 8). 
In a similar case, Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 
625 P.2d 414 {1981), the defendant pled guilty to the charge 
of embezzlement although he denied having any intent to commit 
the crime. In that case, the court thought the defendant's 
guilty plea was properly accepted although he denied the 
intent element of the charge. The charge was made on a strong 
-8-
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factual basis: the defendant understood the charge and 
voluntarily entered his plea. In this case, the plea was also 
voluntarily and knowingly entered (see Point I) and the facts 
supported the charge. 
The facts in this case indicate that appellant did 
have the requisite intent to issue a check against 
insufficient funds. His own attorney stated that in the best 
view of the facts, appellant wrote checks totaling 
approximately $1,900 on an account containing at most $650 (T. 
6, 9). He was personally informed that his Bank of Utah 
account, upon which he relied for the source of his funds, was 
closed (T. 9, 10). He knew that the methods of direct deposit 
of his Social Security checks would take at least two months, 
yet he wrote checks within days (T. 10). He did have 
accumulated Social Security funds due him, but he knew these 
would not definitely be deposited in his bank. Appellant 
actually states that he was told the past-due checks would go 
to him, or the Post Office, or to his bank (T. 14). Thus the 
facts in this case definitely support the charge and show that 
appellant's defense of no intent is without merit. 
Appellant's contention that he had a defense which 
his attorney should have presented is actually irrelevant in 
this appeal. Since appellant was represented by competent 
counsel and entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, he 
waived any defense based on lack of intent. Edwards v. United 
-9-
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States, 256 F.2d 707 (1958); State v. Lowery, 417 P.2d 113 
(Mont. 1966); Thompson v. State, supra. In Combs v. Turner, 
25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 437, 439 (1971), this Court stated 
its position on the issue: 
A plea of guilty dispenses with the 
necessity of proof, and the issue of 
i nnoce nee or gui 1 t cannot he re be 
relitigated any more than it could be 
after a jury verdict of guilty. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON A 
WYOMING PRE-SENTENCE REPORT IN SENTENCING 
APPELLANT. 
Appellant contends the Court should not have relied 
upon a pre-sentence report from Wyoming. However, in 
determining a sentence, the Court needs all relevant 
information available. It is proper to use a pre-sentence 
report a year old from another case. State v. Blier, 113 
Ariz. 501, 557 P.2d 1058 (1976). It is also proper to use 
police arrest reports not contained in the pre-sentence 
report. State v. Murphy, 575 P.2d 448, 461 (Hawaii 1978). In 
that case, the court felt that a judge should not be expected 
to ignore pertinent and helpful information since he needs the 
fullest information concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics. Thus, that court stated: 
-10-
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We conclude that the sentencing court is 
not limited to any particular source of 
information in considering the sentence to 
be imposed upon a defendant. 
Respondent contends that whether the pre-sentence 
report came from Wyoming or Utah is immaterial. Both states 
would use the same national crime information source in 
obtaining the information concerning appellant's past charges 
and convictions. Appellant was given the opportunity to rebut 
the information contained in the report (T. 20-24), and he 
failed to do so in a satisfactory manner. He also failed to 
object to the use of the report, and when asked if he had 
anything to say before sentencing, he said "No, sir" (T. 25). 
When appellant failed to rebut the information contained in 
the pre-sentence report and indicated he was ready to proceed 
with sentencing, he waived any objection to the pre-sentence 
report. State v. Nichols, 24 Ariz. App. 329, 538 P.2d 416 
( 19 7 5) • 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED UNDER THE 
UTAH CODE. 
Appellant claims he was charged with attempting to 
cash an insufficient check. He claims there is no offense 
listed in the Code corresponding to the charge. His 
contention is without merit because he was not charged with 
the offense as he claims. 
-11-
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Appellant was originally charged with Theft by 
Deception, Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-405 (1953), as amended (R. 
1). The information was amended to charge issuing checks 
against insufficient funds, Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-505 (1953), 
as amended {R. 12) (see Point I). Thus, appellant was 
properly charged and sentenced under the Utah Criminal Code. 
CO~CLUSION 
Appellant's conviction and sentence should be 
affirmed for the following reasons. He entered a plea of no 
contest knowingly, voluntarily, and upon the advice of 
competent counsel. His defense of no intent, which had no 
basis in the record, was waived when he entered his plea. The 
Utah court properly used a Wyoming pre-sentence report in 
determining his sentence. Finally, he was properly charged 
under the Utah Criminal Code. 
1982. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of September, 
DAVID L. 
Attorney 
OBERT ~. 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Donald F. 
Williams, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah, 84020, this 2nd day of 
September, 1982. 
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